AD NUMBER

AD480776

NEW LIMITATION CHANGE

TO

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM

Distribution authorized to DoD only; Administrative/Operational Use; JAN 1963. Other requests shall be referred to Army Chief of Research and Development, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

humrro ltr 11 nov 1975

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

HumRRO

480776

FILE COPY

D D C

RECEIVED

APR 2 5 1966

D

U.S. Army Armor Human Research Unit

Fort Knox, Kentucky

Under the Technical Supervision of

The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
operating under contract with
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

US Army Armor Human Research Unit
Fort Knox, Kentucky

A Survey of Problems in the Tactical Training
of Armored Cavalry Platoons

John G. Cook,

Research Memorandum
January 1963,

80 p

A report of work done in connection with Subtask I, RECON, Task 11-34,
Training Methods and Techniques for Improving Combat Readiness of the
Armored Cavalry Platoon

NORMAN WILLARD, JR.,
Director of Research

ABSTRACT

To obtain information on the armored cavalry platoon for use in determining training requirements and developing measures of tactical effectiveness, interviews were held with 15 field commanders on 64 questions covering such problem areas as training difficulties; platoon, section, and squad leader requirements; and special skills. The interviews were tape-recorded. The commanders' chief training difficulties were lack of room for tactical training, complexity of personnel problems, and multiplicity of platoon requirements. The commanders made recommendations related to the preparation of key personnel before assignment, and to the diverse skills and activities which must be developed and coordinated to make this smallest of combined arms teams effective in combat.

A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Survey of Problems in the Tactical Training of Armored Cavalry Platoons

BRIEF

The Military Problem

Armor personnel who are responsible for unit training have often pointed out the difficulties of conducting effective combat training for armored cavalry units, the need for improving both the amount and the quality of armored cavalry training, and the importance of developing for these units a practical standard of combat readiness.

Realizing the need for information on which to base recommendations for improving the training of such units, US Continental Army Command established a research requirement, "The Evaluation and Improvement of Armored Cavalry Training."[1] This study, the first step in the research, was a survey of military opinion on many aspects of the subject. (Later phases will be concentrated on increasing the tactical proficiency of the armored cavalry platoon.)

The Research Problem

The purpose of the survey was to obtain military judgments on the major aspects of armored cavalry training, as a basis for determining the training requirements for making armored cavalry units effective in combat.[2]

It was also designed to obtain information about problems and difficulties of training in relation to the stated missions of these units, and to provide a basis for developing valid and objective measures of combat readiness.

Procedures

A survey of armored cavalry (reconnaissance) literature was made, and the information was used in preparing a list of 64 questions to be used in interviewing armored cavalry squadron commanders who are responsible for reconnaissance training. The questions covered five problem areas:

1. Armored cavalry platoon training problems, practices, and procedures.
2. Platoon leader training requirements.
3. Section and squad leader training requirements.
4. Special skill requirements for armored cavalry platoon personnel.
5. Desirable trends in organization and developments in equipment.

---

[1]The work summarized in this report was done as part of Subtask III, UNIT, before the armored cavalry phase of UNIT research was designated as a new task, RECON, "Training Methods and Techniques for Improving the Combat Readiness of the Armored Cavalry Platoon."

[2]Letter, HQ US Army Armor Center, 3 November 1960, to CG, USCONARC, subject "Proposed Training Research."

iii

The armored cavalry squadrons organic to armored cavalry regiments (except 4 squadrons in Continental US), a cavalry squadron organic to an armored division, and a cavalry squadron organic to an infantry division were visited during the survey (February - August 1961). Using the survey questions, research personnel tape-recorded interviews with 15 squadron commanders, [3] or their designated representatives (in ten cavalry units in Europe and two in CONUS).

Results

The answers to the survey questions pertaining to the five problem areas listed above were tabulated. The major findings for each area are summarized in this report, with accompanying summary tables. The tabulated results and the survey questions are included as appendices.

Among the actions considered by United States Continental Army Command as a result of this report are the following:[4]

> It is to be noted that recommendations...by Armored Cavalry unit commanders were made...before ROAD became an accepted fact. Implementation of ROAD will significantly increase the problem due to the sharp increase in the number of Armored Cavalry and reconnaissance platoons....One solution could be the segmenting of current courses, i. e., a general curricula portion for part of the course and a splitoff of earmarked officers for the balance of the course to be devoted to the reconnaissance operations

> This headquarters is currently determining the feasibility of:

> > Increasing the course length of Armor Officer Orientation Course, 17-A-C20 in order to introduce more armored reconnaissance platoon leader training.

> > Establishing Reconnaissance Platoon Leader Course.

---

[3] Three of them were staff officers who had recently been field commanders.
[4] Inclosure, Letter ATIT-TNG-RSH, 5 October 1962. HQUSCONARC to Director, HumRRO, subject, "Draft Technical Report - UNIT III."

The armored cavalry squadrons organic to armored cavalry regiments (except 4 squadrons in Continental US), a cavalry squadron organic to an armored division, and a cavalry squadron organic to an infantry division were visited during the survey (February - August 1961). Using the survey questions, research personnel tape-recorded interviews with 15 squadron commanders,[3] or their designated representatives (in ten cavalry units in Europe and two in CONUS).

Results

The answers to the survey questions pertaining to the five problem areas listed above were tabulated. The major findings for each area are summarized in this report, with accompanying summary tables. The tabulated results and the survey questions are included as appendices.

Among the actions considered by United States Continental Army Command as a result of this report are the following:[4]

> It is to be noted that recommendations...by Armored Cavalry unit commanders were made...before ROAD became an accepted fact. Implementation of ROAD will significantly increase the problem due to the sharp increase in the number of Armored Cavalry and reconnaissance platoons....One solution could be the segmenting of current courses, i. e., a general curricula portion for part of the course and a splitoff of earmarked officers for the balance of the course to be devoted to the reconnaissance operations

This headquarters is currently determining the feasibility of:

> Increasing the course length of Armor Officer Orientation Course, 17-A-C20 in order to introduce more armored reconnaissance platoon leader training.

> Establishing Reconnaissance Platoon Leader Course.

---

[3]Three of them were staff officers who had recently been field commanders.
[4]Inclosure, Letter ATIT-TNG-RSH, 5 October 1962, HQUSCONARC to Director, HumRRO, subject, "Draft Technical Report - UNIT III."

independent unit actions will be routine. In this type of warfare each individual must be the master of his special skill, and leaders at all echelons must have a thorough knowledge of their profession.

Superior training is mandatory for armored cavalry units, if they are to achieve and sustain the proficiency required. Yet superior training is more difficult to achieve in armored cavalry units than in other types of units because maneuver space is insufficient. "There is not one post or training area in the United States which provides adequate running room and varied terrain to accommodate even the smallest reconnaissance unit, the reconnaissance platoon."[4] Also, there is no ATT for the cavalry platoons of armored cavalry regiments.[5]

Recognizing the problems involved in training armored cavalry units, and the need for increasing their deployment capability and combat readiness, US-CONARC established a research requirement for the evaluation and improvement of armored cavalry training, requesting that the US Army Armor Human Research Unit conduct the research In this research, emphasis will be placed on the training of the basic fighting unit of armored cavalry—the armored cavalry platoon.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

As the first step in this research, personnel at the Armor Human Research Unit attempted to determine the training requirements for armored cavalry units, and to obtain information about the problems involved in the tactical training of such units.

Plans were made to conduct a comprehensive, Army-wide survey of 1) the

---

[4]Reference 4.

[5]Since the survey was made. Armored Cavalry Platoon, ATT 17-101-1, has been issued (Washington· Department of the Army, 5 December 1961).

training status of active armored cavalry TOE units, 2) the materiel and personnel resources which are available to cavalry units, and 3) the problems involved in training these units. The specific objectives of the survey were 1) to determine the problems of armored cavalry tactical training, 2) to find means of improving its quality and increasing its quantity, and 3) to obtain information on tactical proficiency which would be useful in mobilization planning.

METHOD

General Approach

The relevant training literature was studied, to determine what types of questions would be most appropriate for use in the survey. This literature included the field manuals and training circulars on the tactical training of the cavalry platoon, troop, squadron, and regiment; combat literature on the experiences of troops and platoon leaders in World War II and Korea; more recent literature about platoon tactics on the nuclear battlefield; and lesson plans and training literature used at the US Army Armor School for instructing platoon and troop officers in tactical principles and procedures. A selected bibliography of this literature begins on page 27.

The information in the literature was used in compiling a list of 64 questions to be used in interviewing squadron commanders about the training activities of the armored cavalry units under their supervision. The questions, some general and some specific, covered five topics:

1. Armored cavalry platoon training problems, practices, and procedures
2. Platoon leader training requirements

3

3. Section and squad leader training requirements
4. Special skill requirements for armored cavalry platoon personnel
5. Desirable trends in organization and developments in equipment

The interviews were planned to elicit a maximum amount of information about each training practice or problem, and to obtain as many new ideas and as many suggestions for improvement as possible. A question which required a simple yes or no answer was usually supplemented by other questions which might elicit the reasons for the commanders' opinions. During the interviews, additional questions were asked, for the purpose of clarifying and developing the commanders' ideas. [6]

The survey team visited most of the TOE armored cavalry units in Europe and the United States, February-August 1961. Each squadron commander, or his representative, was asked to give as complete an answer as possible to each of the 64 questions. In so far as possible, each interview was recorded on tape. This procedure increased the accuracy of the report, saved interview time, preserved informality, and provided a permanent record of the information obtained. To increase both the validity and the reliability of the answers, the anonymity of the commander was guaranteed.

Each interview took from three to four hours. Before the interview, the commander was asked to complete an information form covering rank, military background, and experience in armored cavalry, and was given a copy of the questionnaire; the interview was held at least 24 hours later so that he would have time to read the questions and think about his answers. The research staff believes that this procedure increased both the amount and validity of the information.

---

[6]The questions which served as the basis for the interviews are listed in Appendix B.

Population and Sampling

As shown below. all squadrons organic to armored cavalry regiments, the squadron organic to an infantry division, and the squadron organic to an armored division were visited in Europe. In continental United States, two squadrons of an armored cavalry regiment were visited. Because of operational difficulties, the 1st Squadron of this ACR was not visited. (Another ACR, which was not conducting training at the time of the survey, was not visited.)

Parent Organization and Squadron	Location
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	
1st Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
2d Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
3d Armored Cavalry Squadron[a]	Germany
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	
2d Armored Cavalry Squadron	Fort Meade
3d Armored Cavalry Squadron	Camp Pickett
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	
1st Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
2d Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
3d Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
14th Armored Cavalry Regiment	
1st Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
2d Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
3d Armored Cavalry Squadron	Germany
3d Infantry Division	
2d Armored Cavalry Squadron, 7th ACR	Germany
4th Armored Division	
2d Armored Cavalry Squadron, 15th ACR	Germany

[a]Because of operational conflicts, data were not gathered at this unit.

The squadron commander, or a representative whom he designated, was interviewed at each of the 12 units listed above. Data were also gathered from two officers in Germany and one officer in CONUS who had just completed regimental or squadron command assignments and who answered the questions in terms of recent command experience. Data are therefore presented for 15 com-

manders—12 from combat-ready units in Seventh Army and 3 from units in CONUS.

Of the 15 officers interviewed, 10 were squadron commanders, 1 was commanding officer of a major training area, 2 were regimental S 3's, and 2 were squadron executive officers acting as squadron commanders at the time of the interview. One officer was a colonel, 7 were lieutenant colonels, and 7 were majors.

All the officers were armor officers; all had attended one or more courses at the Armor School. Each had over 16 years' experience in armor (average 18.6 years). Each had completed at least a year's duty in an armored cavalry unit (average 4 years); two had over 10 years' duty, two over 6 years' duty, in armored cavalry units.

Method of Analysis

When the interview program was completed, the commanders' answers were transcribed directly from the recordings and from the interview forms. In so far as possible, the replies to each question were then tabulated to show the numbers and percentages of commanders who replied in various ways. All their qualifying remarks were reflected in preparing these tabulations.[7]

Portions of replies which were thought to contain information or suggestions of unusual pertinence or value are available on request. To preserve anonymity in these quoted comments, each commander is identified only by a word of the phonetic alphabet and by theater of operation.

---

[7]The tables of data are shown in Appendix A. To reflect the full content of the interview discussion, in some of these tables the statement of the questions has been elaborated beyond the original forms (Appendix B), which served as the starting point for the interview. No specific report is made in Appendix A for a few items which overlapped answers given elsewhere or which did not yield useful material.

Armored Cavalry Platoon Training Problems, Practices, and Procedures

Summaries of opinion on some of the important questions in this portion of the survey are shown in Table 1. (Readers interested in detailed results may also consult Tables A 1 - A 15.)

Command Problems.[9] Their most serious command problem, 7 commanders said, was related to training; 4 said it was personnel turnover; 3—the commanders, respectively, of a cavalry unit organic to an armored division, a cavalry unit organic to an infantry division, and a cavalry unit detached from its parent ACR—said it was the delinquency rate within the command.

Training Difficulties. The 7 commanders who said training was the most serious command problem cited as factors the inadequacy of training areas, the need for more time at a major training area, and the fact that newly assigned platoon leader replacements are not ready for the job.

In specifying their most difficult training problems, more than half of the commanders said their units received little training as intact platoons, for the inadequacy of maneuver areas made coordinated platoon training virtually impossible. Two commanders of units in CONUS said administrative details reduced the number of men who are usually available for training to about 20 per cent of the "for duty" personnel. Three CONUS commanders said that the turnover rate prevented the units from attaining their training objectives (Table A 2).

---

[8]Some of the findings reported in the text are taken from recorded interview materials which have not been tabulated.

[9]Questions on such matters as platoon organization and command problems are dealt with here because they affect the nature and conduct of training.

Table 1

Armored Cavalry Platoon Training Problems, Practices, and Procedures:
Summary Table of Important Commander Responses (N = 15)

Our biggest command problem:	Training	7
	Turnover of personnel	4
Our biggest, most difficult training problem:	Lack of adequate training areas	9
	Excessive turnover of personnel	4
To eliminate such problems, we need:	More and larger maneuver areas.	7
	More time at major training areas.	3
	Better trained replacements.	3
Stay-behind patrol: Platoons are trained to conduct it.		8
There is no SOP which guides us in conducting it.		14
Night training: It is necessary.		15
During the past year it was sufficient.		8
Cross training: Platoon personnel are cross trained.		6
Cross training is truly necessary.		9
Running room and varied terrain: There is not enough.		12
We use CPX's and wheeled vehicle exercises as expedients.		3
We have had locating of targets for mass destruction weapons as a mission during maneuvers.		8
Independence of operation: The platoon operates independently.		8
This independence of operation is normal.		6
This independence occurs only: When we have special mission.		3
When we are cut off.		2
Most important missions usually given platoon:	Zone reconnaissance	12
	Route reconnaissance	13
	Counterreconnaissance	10
	Delaying action	11
Combat readiness of unit: It is combat ready.		10a
It needs more field work to be combat ready.		3
Employment of tank section:	Usually as a unit	15
	Always as a unit	6
Not as a unit:	When we are given 2 routes to recon	4
	When we have 2 avenues of approach	3
Platoon organization: It is satisfactory.		12
Familiarity with FM 5-36: All platoon personnel need it.		7
Scouts must have it.		8
Proposal for 2 career patterns--command and staff: I concur.		6

[a]Some of the responses were qualified. See text, page 9.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

As a means of eliminating major training problems, 7 commanders suggested acquiring more and larger maneuver areas, 3 suggested spending more time in maneuver areas which are already available, and 3 said they wanted to receive better trained, more highly qualified replacements.

Night Training. Every commander interviewed declared tha. night reconnaissance training for the armored cavalry platoon is an absolute necessity. But in spite of such remarks as "Can't get enough." "You never get too much," and "Absolutely essential," 7 said that current training at night was not sufficient to maintain satisfactory standards; 8 said night training was sufficient, but 3 of these qualified the opinion with such statements as "for border personnel only," "for scouts only," and "for scouts and infantry only." The primary reason given for not training the entire platoon in night operations was the inadequacy of the available training area (unless the unit visited an existing major training area).

"Running" Room. The factor which most seriously limits the training of armored cavalry platoons seems to be the lack of sufficient "running" room and varied terrain for conducting satisfactory platoon training. Because local areas are small and because the time allocated to units at major training areas is limited, satisfactory tactical training is not always possible.

Platoon training is normally confined to wheeled vehicles, for tanks cannot get off the roads because of local area damage. Nine officers said they could not fully overcome this training area deficiency; 5 of these said they did not overcome it at all. Nine commanders added that their units could not completely overcome the difficulty in spite of training expedients and initiative.

Combat Readiness. A majority of the commanders interviewed said their

8

units were combat ready. But 4 of the 10 commanders in Seventh Army who said so, qualified the response with such comments as these: "We need more field work," "We need more time to maneuver," "I would keep my fingers crossed," and "Too many household duties adversely affect our training—but we would fight." The 3 commanders in CONUS said they were definitely not combat ready, and cited the great need for more field training. To summarize, 6 of the 15 commanders said definitely that their units were combat ready. The biggest hindrances to attaining a combat-ready status were said to be inadequacy of maneuver space and insufficiency of time in the field.

On-Duty Activities. Commanders were asked to estimate the proportion of on-duty time which their units now devote to four types of activity, [10] and then to indicate the proportion of time they feel should be spent on these types of activity. All units were engaged in about the same type of training, and had similar objectives. Yet the time which they said was devoted to the types of on-duty activity ranged from 5 to 70%; the time which they thought should be spent on tactical training ranged from 30 to 80%. In spite of wide variance in their opinions, the commanders clearly indicated that they wanted to increase tactical training time by 19%, decrease nontactical training time by 5%, increase combat-readiness maintenance by 7%, and reduce noncombat-readiness activities by 21%. (Only average percentages are shown in Table A 15.)

"Stay-Behind" Patrol. To the question on whether or not platoons were trained to conduct reconnaissance behind enemy lines, there were 8 yes and 7 no answers. But the responses did not truly reflect the circumstances. All the yes

[10] 1) Tactical training; 2) nontactical training; 3) combat-readiness maintenance; and 4) noncombat-readiness activities.

answers were qualified with this remark: "We do not train the entire platoon, but we do train selected people in long range (stay-behind) patrol operations." Five commanders who gave no responses said they trained selected personnel in this type of patrol operation. Two of the 15 said they did not train anyone in "reconnaissance behind enemy lines," since it is not covered by the ATP. The other 13 agreed on the specific training which these squads require; but only one of the 13 had prepared an SOP covering long range (stay-behind) patrol activities; the others said that an SOP is essential, and that they would prepare one immediately.

"Cross Training." Two possible goals of "cross training" in an organization which has the multiple missions of an armored cavalry platoon are 1) to train all members to do all jobs (complete cross training), and 2) to train all members to do one primary duty and one secondary duty (limited cross training).

Nine commanders said that complete cross training of platoon personnel is truly necessary. In reply to the question, "Which elements are truly interchangeable?" 5 said that the rifle squad was interchangeable with the scout section; 2 said the support squad was interchangeable with the rifle squad; 4 said the scout section was interchangeable with the rifle squad; 3 said the scout section was interchangeable with the tank section; and 2 said the tank section was interchangeable with the scout section. It appears that even though a majority of the commanders consider complete cross training necessary, their replies suggest that even limited cross training is not being achieved.

Missions. To the question, "During maneuvers have you ever had the specific mission of finding locations of potential targets for friendly mass

destruction weapons?" there were 8 yes replies and 7 no replies. But 11 of the 15 commanders said that such a mission was normal or was contained in the SOP or the EEI. and that it was therefore not a specific mission and should not be so considered.

The commanders listed 13 types of missions which they said could normally be assigned to an armored cavalry platoon. They were asked to list these missions in the order of their relative importance and frequency. They said that zone reconnaissance was the most important mission, but that route reconnaissance was the one most often assigned. There was very little difference between zone reconnaissance, route reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance (screening), and delaying action, in either importance or frequency. The missions of lowest importance and frequency were rearguard action, attack, route security, and patrols.

Platoon Organization. Twelve commanders said that the current organization of th, armored cavalry platoon is completely satisfactory, in view of multiple mission requirements. A few commanders submitted these suggestions, which they said would improve the fighting capability and staying power of the platoon during independent action: Add two men to the mortar squad; add a tank to the tank section; add two scout vehicles to the scout section (one per scout squad).

Operation and Employment. To the question, "Does the armored cavalry platoon operate independently?" there were 8 yes replies and 7 no replies. Six commanders who said yes said it was normal for a platoon to operate independently; the other 2 said it would be a special mission. Six of the 7 who said

11

no said the platoon would operate independently under certain specified circumstances. Only one said it would never operate independently. That is, 14 of the 15 said that the armored cavalry platoon does operate independently, either in accomplishing a normal mission or under certain specified circumstances.

Fourteen commanders said they organized the rifle squad into two fire teams; only one said he kept the squad as an intact unit.

All said the tank section was normally employed as a unit. But when they were asked, "Is the tank section always employed as a unit?" 9 said it would be split when the situation required; that is, when there were two avenues of enemy approach, two routes of advance, two crossing sites, two streets in a built-up area, two road blocks, or delay over a broad front on two avenues.

Career Patterns. There has been considerable informal discussion about the question of two career patterns for armor officers—a command pattern and an administrative pattern. The unofficial proposal (Table A 14, p. 38) was endorsed by 6 commanders, who gave these reasons for their opinion: "We are not all born leaders," "This is the only answer to a bad situation," "Let's recognize the true facts —there are two groups," and "It is a sound idea." The 8 officers who opposed the proposal gave these reasons: "A superior officer will be superior in any capacity," "It would create two branches," and "A staff officer must have command experience."

FM 5-36. A majority of the commanders (all in Seventh Army) said it was not necessary to familiarize all platoon personnel with the engineer manual, FM 5-36, Route Reconnaissance and Classification; the 3 commanders in CONUS disagreed. Eight commanders in Seventh Army said that familiarity with this

FO. OFF.CIAL U'E ONLY

manual is a requirement for scouts, but not for the whole platoon.

Platoon Leader Training Requirements

Some of the important responses of the commanders to questions about their platoon leaders are shown in Table 2. Interested readers may also refer to Tables A 16 - A 37 for tabulated responses to the questions pertaining to the platoon leader.

Platoon Leader Deficiencies. The commanders showed their awareness of the strengths of their officer replacements, and proudly emphasized the young officer's "youth, ambition, aggressiveness, exuberance, desire to learn, ability to learn, dedication to duty," and so on. But they also said, "Dedication and determination is not enough—these young officers need knowledge prior to assignment." In other words, they agreed generally that newly assigned platoon leaders have the capability of exercising effective command, but not the knowledge, skill, or "know-how."

According to the commanders, almost every armored cavalry platoon leader assigned to them has been graduated from the Armor Officer Basic Course or the Armor Officer Orientation Course at the Armor School. The portion of this training devoted to the armored cavalry platoon consists of a few days of orientation; in other words, the training is intended to be general rather than specific. The commanders emphasized that a graduate of these courses is unable to command, control, and employ an armored cavalry platoon. In fact, they volunteered such comments as "They were taught nothing, know nothing," "He is completely unprepared to command an armor cavalry platoon," and "They are certainly not platoon leaders."

13

Table 2

Armored Cavalry Platoon Leader Training Requirements: Summary Table of
Important Commander Responses (N = 15)

The present training system for platoon leaders is unsatisfactory.	15
Newly assigned platoon leaders are: partially qualified.[a]	8
poorly qualified.	7
It takes over 10 weeks to make them combat ready.	11
It takes 8 to 12 months to make them combat ready.	8
They acquire skills at: Seventh Army Training Center.	15
Squadron schools.	12
Platoon leaders are graduates of AOB or AOO course (Armor School).	12
Neither course prepares them to command, control, or employ the armored cavalry platoon.	14
I want my platoon leaders to be fully qualified on assignment.	15
Platoon leaders should receive special training in armored cavalry before assignment.	15
Reasons for requiring such a course:	
The platoon is complex--4 unlike elements	15
Replacements cannot command and control the platoon	15
Replacements do not know how to employ the platoon	15
Subjects needed: squad and section, functions and employment	12
platoon tactics, all types of missions	14
command and control	14
all weapons (especially mortar)	12
communications	10
maintenance (all platoon vehicles)	8
The course should be given at the Armor School.	15
The platoon leader's greatest strength is youth, ambition, desire.	14
His greatest weakness is: insufficient tactical background.	10
inability to coordinate 4 unlike elements.	14
lack of knowledge of how platoon operates.	15
He does not know how to: employ rifle squad.	12
employ support squad.	13
employ scout section.	14
Platoon leader needs to be fully qualified, to teach employment of:	
rifle squad.	13
support squad.	14
tank section.	14
scout section.	15
integrated platoon.	15
Unit training should include: on-job training.	15
polish and experience.	14
opportunity to apply knowledge.	15
Platoon leader should not always be last to withdraw during a delaying action.	10

[a]Five explained that the platoon leaders "know something," but that
extra training is required because they lack "know-how."

Only 8 commanders rated newly assigned platoon leaders as high as "partially qualified"; 5 of these said that such replacements "knew something," but that they were not prepared to assume or discharge the normal responsibilities of the job; 7 said flatly that they were unqualified. They have insufficient knowledge of tactics, equipment, employment, organization, and command and control, and are therefore unprepared to do the job of a platoon leader.

The commanders emphasized that the newly assigned platoon leader's greatest handicap in effectively coordinating, commanding, and controlling the armored cavalry platoon is his lack of schooling and training in the organization, operation, and employment of such a platoon. The commanders agreed unanimously that there is very little similarity, if any, between the skills required of a tank platoon leader and those required of an armored cavalry platoon leader. They mentioned the following unique characteristics of the armored cavalry platoon:

> The ACR platoon is a very complex organization which consists of four dissimilar elements, each having its own characteristic speed, weapons, communications, maintenance, and methods of operation.

> Each of the four elements has its own missions within the platoon, and these elements must be coordinated and integrated (by the platoon leader) to accomplish one platoon mission.

> The armored cavalry platoon leader must control the action of unseen subordinate elements, operating on the fringe (rather than within a mass), and must make more decisions, which have a greater effect on his success or failure.

> The platoon, and its various elements, must be employed and controlled exactly—not generally.

The newly assigned platoon leader's inability to cope with his job was repeatedly emphasized by the commanders in their answers to various questions;

14 FO : OFFICIAL USE ONLY

two summary statements follow.

The platoon leader 1) commands the smallest combined arms team in the army—and does not know how; 2) is frightened to his "boot-tops" when he first views his command (the platoon) in the motor park; 3) does not know the function of any of the platoon's elements, except perhaps the tank element; and 4) is therefore unprepared to employ three of the elements separately, or the four elements together in coordinated action. In short he is unable to command and operate his platoon.

The great weakness of the newly assigned platoon leader is that he knows how to employ only one of the platoon elements, the tank section, and does not know how to employ this section in coordination with the other platoon elements. Hence his greatest weakness is lack of knowledge, a void in background or schooling, to which the commanders attributed such deficiencies as these:

> Inadequacy of tactical knowledge
> Inability to employ and control scouts
> Tendency to forget elements which are not in sight
> Inability to handle the span of control of four dissimilar elements
> Lack of knowledge of how an armored cavalry platoon operates

Result of Platoon Leader Deficiencies. Under the conditions which may be inferred from these opinions and comments of the commanders, every class of personnel suffers. In the first place, the opinions elaborated above show that the newly assigned platoon leader has neither the knowledge nor the other qualifications required to teach 1) specific duties to individual platoon personnel, 2) manner and method of employment to squad and section, and 3) manner and method of integrated platoon employment. The commanders agreed that to teach the first of these, the platoon leader must know the skills of the platoon

15

members, and that to teach the second and third he must be <u>fully qualified</u>.

The platoon leader must therefore be trained in the unit. Eleven commanders said that "more than 10 weeks" of training are required to bring the newly assigned platoon leader to the combat-ready level; the majority of these specified that the time really required is from 8 to 12 months. Most of the commanders said also that without the knowledge and dependability of experienced noncommissioned officers, the training situation would be impossible, because the NCO who must train his squad and section must also help the young platoon leader acquire practical knowledge and experience. This training is complicated by the lack of terrain over which the commander may "work" his platoon.

All the commanders interviewed in Europe gave high praise to the Seventh Army Combined Arms Training Center at Vilseck, Germany, for its contribution to the training of armored cavalry platoon leaders.[11] Yet they agreed that the Vilseck school is not the answer to the platoon leader training problem; what they truly need is not students but platoon leaders—commanders of armored cavalry platoons. In other words, as every commander pointed out, the platoon leader needs to be fully qualified on assignment. Under the existing situation, the commanders are unduly burdened, for their mission is to make the unit combat ready and to maintain this degree of preparedness.

<u>Division of Training—School and On-Job</u>. The commanders said that the burden of training should be shared by the Armor School, which should provide armored cavalry platoon leaders with special training before they are assigned to cavalry units. They were asked to suggest specific subjects which a special

[11]Vilseck inaugurated the Armored Cavalry Platoon Leader's Course to fill the gap in this area of training.

16

course should include; the following subjects received 8 to 14 votes:

Platoon tactics for each type of platoon mission
Functions and capabilities of each section and squad
Command and control
All platoon weapons
Communications
Maintenance procedures on all types of vehicles issued to the platoon

In general, commander opinion on what skills should be developed in school was the same as commander opinion on present platoon leader deficiencies. Every commander emphasized that he wanted officer replacements to be fully qualified on assignment. Provided the replacement arrives with a knowledge of "the tools of his trade," on-job training will mold and polish him, give him confidence, and make him an effective platoon commander in weeks rather than months.

Young officers must develop confidence in command, and can attain this goal quickly through experience; for on-job training will give them the opportunity to develop and apply their knowledge of leadership, tactics, and maintenance, under the supervision and tutelage of the commanders. Fourteen of the commanders said that tests and constant supervision provided adequate means of measuring the platoon leaders' state of combat readiness.

Responses to Miscellaneous Questions. All but two commanders said that a "fully qualified" platoon leader does not need a thorough knowledge of squadron tactics. Eight said that to be fully qualified, he does not need to know troop tactics. One commander expressed the opinion thus: "We cannot expect him to have a thorough knowledge of troop tactics, when it requires all . . .his time during his tour of duty . . .just to become acquainted with platoon tactics." Seven commanders disagreed, insisting that a thorough knowledge of troop tac-

17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

tics is needed by the "fully qualified" platoon leader—is essential to the performance of his duties.

The vote of the commanders was two to one against the concept that "the platoon leader remains with the last element to withdraw"[12] in a delaying action. Sample comments follow. 1) The platoon leader should always be where he can best control the fulfillment of the platoon mission—this does not always mean with the last element; 2) he may be required to prepare the next delay position; 3) in withdrawing behind a barrier, he may be more concerned with organizing the new position than with staying with the last element; 4) the width of the sector may require moving back, so that he can communicate, and control the action of his platoon; 5) the doctrine is in this respect too restrictive. These comments suggest that some clarification of concept is needed.

Section and Squad Leader Training Requirements

Important responses to questions in this area are shown in Table 3. Readers who are interested in further detail may also refer to Tables A 38 - A 48.

System of Replacement. All the commanders said that the replacement system for enlisted personnel needs revision, though 3 said it worked satisfactorily in general. No commander was certain where his replacements came from—not really important information—but every commander recommended "quality control" of replacements.

The commanders said that, regardless of training center source, replacements for armored cavalry units should be trained specifically as armored

---

[12]FM 17-35 (February 1960), paragraph 135 a, page 85. (See Reference 17.)

18

Table 3

Squad and Section Leader Training Requirements: Summary Table
of Important Commander Responses (N = 15)

The unit receives enlisted replacements by MOS.	14
We have to give them new MOS's.	11
They can be assigned to a specific section or squad without changing their MOS.	8[a]
Replacement system does not work satisfactorily from our viewpoint.	11
Enlisted replacements are not trained in recon skills.	13
They must be retrained for recon and often be given new MOS's.	10
Replacements for sections and squads are not qualified.	14
Section and squad leader replacements are not qualified.	12
Rifle squad leaders have inadequate knowledge of their MOS.	8
Support squad leaders are not trained in recon skills.	11
Scout section leaders do not know how to scout for recon units.	10
Tank section leaders: are not qualified for the recon platoon.	10
do not know recon platoon operations.	11
Major difficulties in conducting squad and section training:	
Lack of running room	9
Lack of firing ranges	7
Lack of training time	6
Scouts and riflemen should have demolitions training.	9
These personnel should be trained to detect mines and booby traps:	
platoon leader.	14
tank section leader.	10
scout section leader.	15
scout squad leader.	13
scout observer.	10
rifle squad leader.	15
senior rifleman.	14
rifleman.	13
Sections and squads have the required night skills.	11
There is a way of determining how well they know these skills.	14[b]
Observation of training is used to determine their proficiency.	12
Not all section and squad leaders know how to command all other sections and squads.	15
This versatility is not an absolute requirement.	15
The training received by sections and squads is adequate.	9[c]
The training received by the intact platoon is unsatisfactory.	9
All platoon personnel are required to know how to call for and adjust artillery fire.	14

[a]Responses were qualified by such phrases as *generally*, *except mortar*, *most of the time*, *usually*, and *we must*.

[b]Many said that a test and check list are urgently needed.

[c]Some responses were qualified: "When we have running room."

cavalry replacements. Under the present system, for example, rifle replacements come from pure infantry units, and on arrival they have to be retrained by the absorbing cavalry unit because they have no knowledge of reconnaissance-type operations. Again, support squad replacements must be retrained because "they do not realize that they are a direct support weapon for a fast-moving and highly mobile unit"; tank crews know their tanks, but they "are not qualified or trained for reconnaissance-type operations" and must be retrained by the receiving unit. Scout replacements just do not exist; they must therefore be trained by the cavalry unit.

The commanders emphasized that because of combat-ready missions, inadequacy of training areas, and the poor quality of replacements (with respect to training for cavalry), welding a platoon into an effective fighting unit—and maintaining its effectiveness—is a continuous source of frustration. One commander expressed the consensus in this way: "The replacement system is ridiculous. They are not recon trained; and those who are, are not quality controlled. Each training center has different ideas as to what is required—but none are MOS qualified."

Training. The primary difficulties met with in the training of section and squad personnel are lack of "running" room and firing ranges, and scarcity of time. The fact that section and squad training must start from "scratch" hinders progress in developing trained sections and squads. Considering qualifying statements, commander opinion was about equally divided on whether or not this phase of training was adequate.

The majority of commanders said that intact platoon training was not

| FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |

satisfactory. The chief reason given was the unavailability of training areas.

Most of the commanders said that every member of the armored cavalry platoon except the support squad leader and his crew should be trained in the detection and removal of mines and booby traps. More than half of the commanders said that because of its position and mission within the platoon, the support squad would not be faced with mine and booby trap detection and removal. Most of the commanders said emphatically that skill in emplacement and removal of demolitions should be mastered by scouts and by infantry personnel.

Commanders were asked to name the skills which are required of armored cavalry platoon personnel in carrying out a platoon mission in darkness. The skills named by the most commanders are listed below. See also Table A 45.

Tank Section:	Infrared (for firing and driving), 13
	Searchlight employment, 11
	Firing with artificial light, 10
Scout Section:	Night driving, navigation, 12
	Mounted and dismounted patrols, 11
	Infrared firing and firing with artificial light, 9
Rifle Squad:	Dismounted movement, 13
	Command and control techniques, 10
Support Squad:	Night firing, 14
	Selection of firing position, 11
	Night movement (mounted), 10

Most of the commanders also said that as determined by "observation of training," their sections and squads were proficient in these skills, but a number of them mentioned the vital need for a standardized night test and check list. Only three commanders said they used a test as a measuring device to determine night training proficiency.

With one exception, the commanders agreed on the absolute necessity

for every member of the armored cavalry platoon to be proficient in calling for

and adjusting artillery fire.

On cross training of section and squad leaders, the commanders agreed

that these men were not capable of commanding sections and squads beside their

own, but that this versatility was definitely not a requirement.

Special Skills Requirements

Important responses to questions in this area are shown in Table 4.

Readers interested in detailed results may also refer to Tables A 49 - A 60.

Map Reading. Asked to specify which personnel require various levels

of map reading skill, all 15 commanders said the platoon leader needs advanced

map reading. All 15 said the scout section leader needs intermediate map read-

ing; 14 said he needs advanced map reading. Other tabulated results follow.

(See also Tables A 49 - A 51.)

> Advanced Map Reading: Tank section leader, 7
> Support squad leader, 10
> Rifle squad leader, 5
>
> Intermediate Map Reading: Tank section leader, 9
> Support squad leader, 12
> Rifle squad leader, 9

Only 7 commanders said the tank section leader needs advanced map reading;

the others may have rated him strictly on tank section requirements, not on the

fact that as platoon sergeant—second in command—he may become the platoon

leader's replacement in combat.

CBR Monitoring and Survey Operations. In a small majority of the units

visited, scout section personnel were trained in CBR operations and were capa-

ble of conducting them. Commanders in a few of the units said that only the

scout section and scout squad leaders required this skill. The equipment need-

21

Table 4

Special Skills Requirements: Summary of Important Commander Responses
(N = 15)

Advanced map reading is a requirement for:	platoon leader.	15
	tank section leader.	7
	support squad leader.	10
	rifle squad leader.	5
	scout section leader.	14
Intermediate map reading is required for:	tank section leader.	9
	support squad leader.	12
	rifle squad leader.	9

The scout section or rifle squad has been employed in airmobile
operations in the past year: 0 times.   10
·n..e.   2
2 to 5 times.   1
During the operation scout vehicles were air transported.   1

Scout personnel have a thorough knowledge of:
selecting and marking landing sites.   6
arm and hand signals to guide aircraft.   4
emergency procedures for take-off, flight, landing.   4
way to load and secure equipment in a helicopter.   2
The above procedures are necessary.   9

All scout section personnel should be able to perform CBR
monitoring and survey operations.   15
All members of the scout section are trained in CBR skills.   8
Personnel who should have these skills: scout section leaders   7
scout squad leaders   6
The necessary equipment for the operations is available.   12

Personnel assigned to fire the rocket launcher: rifle squad leader   2
senior rifleman   6
rifleman   6
Reason: the rifleman is the most available.   5
the senior rifleman is the most experienced.   5

All members of the platoon are trained in decontamination
procedures for all types of vehicles assigned.14
This training is an essential requirement.   15

Scouts are trained to perform authorized maintenance on scout
radio equipment.   12
Scouts need this skill.   13

All scouts are trained in writing clear and precise messages.   14
This requirement is essential.   15

Platoon personnel are trained in use of air photos.   10
Air photo interpretation is not a requirement at platoon level.   13
The present communication system is adequate for complete control
of the platoon under all normal operating conditions.   12

ed for CBR operations had been issued to all but three platoons, and was available on call for two of these. All the commanders said that skill in CBR monitoring and survey operations is an absolute, definite requirement for the scout section of the platoon. They disagreed only on which personnel in the scout section should have this capability.

Rocket Launcher in the Rifle Squad.[13] An effort was made to determine what member of the rifle squad was assigned specifically to fire the rocket launcher. Two commanders said, "No one is specifically assigned to the weapon"; two said, "Do not know"; and two said, "Varies within each unit." The majority of the other 9 commanders assigned the weapon to either a senior rifleman or rifleman. Two reasons given were that the senior rifleman "is a better than average soldier," and that the rifleman "is the most readily available." Using riflemen leaves the squad leader free to command and the driver to fire the .50 caliber machine gun.

Short Range Ground Radar. Asked which personnel are trained to operate the short range ground radar, 13 commanders said their units did not have the equipment. Two commanders, whose units do have the equipment, said that the training of selected personnel to operate short range ground radar is the responsibility of Squadron Headquarters.[14] The majority of the commanders were opposed to having ground radar equipment organic to the platoons, because platoon strength would need to be increased by the number of communications people required to operate the equipment. Only 3 favored having the

---

[13]In ROAD, there will not be a rocket launcher in the rifle squad. It will have 2 grenade launchers, with grenadiers.

[14]In ROAD, there is an assigned crew for short range radar at Troop Headquarters.

22

radar equipment issued to the platoon. Most of them said the radar teams should be at Troop Headquarters—on call by platoons when the service is required.

Decontamination Procedures. Fourteen commanders said that all platoon personnel were trained in the decontamination procedures for each type of vehicle issued. Commanders unanimously asserted that each individual must know these procedures.

Use of Air Photographs. The majority of the commanders said that platoon personnel are trained in the use of air photos. But personnel are not trained at all, 12 commanders said, in air photo interpretation, for this skill is definitely not required at the platoon level.

Radio Equipment and Operation. The commanders said there is no requirement for a CW radio operator or equipment at the platoon level; but two commanders suggested that CW equipment would be necessary if the platoon operated on a "stay-behind patrol" mission.

Every scout in the platoon, 13 commanders declared, must be able to perform all authorized maintenance on assigned radio equipment. Scout personnel in 14 of the units were trained to prepare clear, concise messages, both oral and written; this requirement is mandatory, the commanders said.

The commanders were generally satisfied with the platoon communications system. One suggestion was that a vehicular radio be mounted in each scout vehicle; the requirement for a tank radio in the platoon leader's 1/4-ton truck was also mentioned.

Desirable Trends in Organization and Equipment

See Table 5 and Tables A 61 - A 63.

23

Nuclear Battlefield. Most of the commanders said definitely that the present organizational structure of the armored cavalry regiment is adequate for any foreseeable nuclear battlefield. Only one commander suggested a change—that personnel spaces be added, at all levels, to provide depth.

Equipment. Only one commander said that all the vehicular equipment in the armored cavalry squadron is satisfactory. A number of them emphasized the need for a "tracked Scout vehicle," for the "return of the light tank to armor cavalry platoons," and for "a more reliable APC"; "the inadequacy of the recovery vehicle to cope with the M48A2 tank" was also mentioned.

Weapons. The majority of commanders were satisfied with the present family of weapons. Two commanders wanted to have a 20mm gun mounted on the scout vehicles and on the rifle squad carrier. One said that the M14 rifle was unreliable under field conditions, being too light, and constantly malfunctioning when the weather was cold and when it was not kept "ready for inspection."

Training Literature. Training literature which is written specifically for the armored cavalry platoon was said to be desperately needed. The commanders want a manual for the leader of the small unit. They said that FM 17-35 tells "what to do" only in general terms, and that what is truly needed is something which tells the platoon leader (and section and squad leaders) how and why.[15] The commanders' remarks left no doubt that they consider an "Armored Cavalry Platoon Guide" absolutely essential.

---

[15]After the survey was conducted, the Army published Armored Cavalry Platoon and Troop, Air Cavalry Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron, FM 17-36 (21 December 1961). The new FM gives more detail than FM 17-35 for the platoon and squad levels.

Table 5

Desirable Trends in Organization and Developments in Equipment: Summary
Table of Important Commander Responses (N = 15)

The present organization of the armored cavalry platoon is adequate
for the future nuclear battlefield.   11

We are not satisfied with our present vehicular equipment.   14
     The ¼-ton scout vehicle should be replaced with a track vehicle. 8
     The M59 is a constant source of mechanical trouble.   5
     The M48 should be replaced by a light tank.   7

Armored cavalry platoon literature is not adequate.   14
     We need emphasis on techniques of operation for squad,
     section, and platoon leaders.   11
     We need literature which provides check lists for squad,
     section, and platoon leaders.   8
     A field manual directed to the platoon is a requirement.   14
     FM 17-35 is unsuited for the platoon.   11

CONCLUSIONS AND PRINCIPAL SUGGESTIONS

Strong military opinion on two aspects of the armored cavalry platoon training situation emerged from the survey.

1. Armored cavalry platoon training needs to be improved, and there should be more and better tactical training for the platoon.

2. The inadequacy of training areas and the multiplicity of personnel problems and of activities not related to combat readiness are the chief obstacles to carrying on the training which is needed.

Most of the suggestions made by the commanders for improving the training of the platoon and of the personnel assigned to it pertain to solving or surmounting these difficulties. A list of their most important suggestions follows.

Training Problems, Practices, and Procedures

1) Training of cavalry units at the major training areas should be so scheduled as to allot to the armored cavalry platoon more time for training as an intact platoon. 2) The number of nontactical training requirements and of non-combat-readiness activities should be reduced, and the time given to tactical training and to sustaining combat readiness should be increased. 3) The job preparation of personnel who are sent to the armored cavalry platoon as replacements should be improved.

Platoon Leader Training Requirements

1) The US Army Armor School should be authorized to inaugurate a special course of instruction for the specific purpose of developing armored cavalry platoon leaders. Junior officers should be required to take this course before being assigned to armored cavalry units. 2) Until this course has been established (or alternatively), the Seventh Army Training Center (Vilseck) should

be authorized to train newly assigned armored cavalry platoon leaders.

Section and Squad Leader Training Requirements

1) Since the job requirements for armored cavalry platoon personnel differ markedly from the infantry, tank, and mortar squad training which these personnel usually receive, armored cavalry training for NCO replacements should be formalized. 2) If a high level of proficiency is to be achieved and sustained, an armored cavalry training program should be developed to insure quality control of replacements. 3) Another digit should be added to the MOS number to specify that armor replacements have armored cavalry training.

Special Skill Requirements

Before assignment, scouts should be trained to discharge duties and missions required by armored cavalry units.

Desirable Developments in Equipment

1) A tracked scout vehicle which has no turret; 2) a light tank for armored cavalry platoons; and 3) a manual for platoon, section, and squad leaders, explaining graphically the what, how, and why of each platoon mission.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LITERATURE CONSULTED IN PREPARING THE QUESTIONS

Books and Articles

1. Disney, Paul A., Col. Tactical Problems for Armor Units. Harrisburg: Military Service, 1952.

2. Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Actions in Korea: Infantry, Artillery, Armor. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954.

3. Howze, Hamilton H., Maj Gen. Notes on the Training of an Armored Division. Washington: US Armor Association, 1958.

4. Beckley, Stuart A., Lt. "Training Expedients for Reconnaissance Units," Armor, LXVII, 2 (March-April 1958), 28-33.

5. Burke, James T., Lt Col. "Armored Infantry and Recon Unit Organization," Armor, LXV, 4 (July-August 1956), 15-17.

6. Clarke, Bruce C., Lt Gen. "Armored Cavalry Regiments along the Iron Curtain," Armor, LXVII, 3 (May-June 1958), 22-27.

7. Davis, Ken A., Lt. "Better Security—Better Reconnaissance," Armor, LXIII, 4 (July-August 1954), 2-3 (Letters to the Editor).

8. Disney, Paul A., Col. "Armored Cavalry of the Present—and Future," Armored Cavalry Journal, LVII, 1 (January-February 1948), 33-34.

9. Faith, John C., Capt. "Individual, Squad, Section, and Platoon Testing," Armor, LXVIII, 6 (November-December 1959), 34-35.

10. Jacobs, Bruce. "Armored Cavalry in the National Guard," Armor, LXVI, 5 (September-October 1957), 31-33.

11. Pickett, George B., Jr., Lt Col. "Eyes and Ears for Tomorrow's Commanders," Armor, LXIV, 5 (September-October 1955), 30-31.

12. Potts, William E., Lt Col. "Reconnaissance Platoon Leader," Armor, LXVIII, 4 (July-August 1959), 48.

Department of the Army Publications

13. Manual of Enlisted Military Occupational Specialties, Change 23, AR 611-201. Washington: Department of the Army, May 1959 (MOS Code 133).

14. Route Reconnaissance and Classification, FM 5-36. Washington: Department of the Army, April 1955.

15. Armor Operations, Small Units, FM 17-1. Washington: Department of the Army, August 1957, pp. 86-110.

16. Reconnaissance Platoon and Reconnaissance Company, FM 17-22. Washington: Department of the Army, May 1950, pp. 65-124.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

17. Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, and Squadron, FM 17-35. Washington:
    Department of the Army, February 1960, pp. 49-87, 227-234.

18. The Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion, FM 17-95. Washington:
    Department of the Army, September 1951.

19. The Armored Division and Combat Command, FM 17-100. Washington:
    Department of the Army, May 1958, pp. 13-17.

20. Military Training, FM 21-5. Washington: Department of the Army,
    January 1957.

21. Combat Intelligence, FM 30-5. Washington: Department of the Army,
    December 1956, pp. 105-109.

22. Field Regulations - Operations, FM 100-5. Washington: Department of the
    Army, September 1954, pp. 47-56.

23. Commissioned and Warrant Officer Personnel Military Occupational Special-
    ties, SR 605-105-5. Washington: Department of the Army, March 1954
    (MOS Codes 1204, 1542).

24. Army Training Program for Armored Cavalry Regiment, ATP 17-305. Washington:
    Department of the Army: 30 August 1954.

25. Reconnaissance Platoon, ATT 17-3 (TDE 17-57). Washington: Department of
    the Army, 14 March 1956.

Miscellaneous Military Publications

26. Training Guidelines for the Commander. Fort Monroe: United States
    Continental Army Command, 1959.

27. Battle Drill, TM 61-1. Seventh United States Army, 1954.

28. Reference Data for Armor Units. Fort Knox: US Army Armor School,
    November 1959 (FOUO), pp. 68-71.

29. Introduction to Armored Cavalry, Lesson Plan CSA R10001. Fort Knox:
    US Army Armor School, October 1958.

30. Armored Cavalry Platoon Teams, Reconnaissance Missions, Lesson Plan CSA
    R15102. Fort Knox: US Army Armor School, December 1958.

31. Armored Cavalry Platoon Teams, Reconnaissance Missions, Lesson Plan CSA
    R15102a. Fort Knox: US Army Armor School, October 1958.

32. Armored Cavalry Platoon Teams, Security Missions, Lesson Plan CSA R16102a.
    Fort Knox: US Army Armor School, October 1958.

APPENDIX A: Tabulated Results of the Interviews

Tables A 1 - A 15: Armored Cavalry Platoon Training Problems, Practices,
                     and Procedures

Table A 1

What do you consider to be your biggest command problem or headache?

	Combat Ready (N = 11)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Training	6	1	7	50.0
Turnover of Personnel	2	2	4	28.6
Discipline	3	0	3	21.4
Total	11[a]	3	14	100.0

[a]The total does not include one commander, a regimental S 3 who declined to give an opinion because he was "not in a position of command."

Table A 2

What is your biggest or most difficult training problem?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
lack of adequate training areas	9	0	9	60.0
Excessive personnel turnover	1	3	4	26.7
Untrained platoon leader replacements	2	0	2	13.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

What do you need to solve or eliminate it?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total	Percentage
More and larger maneuver areas	7	0	7	46.7
More time at major training areas	2	1	3	20.0
Better trained replacements	3	0	3	20.0
Relief from excessive post details	0	2	2	13.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 3

Is the armored cavalry platoon trained to conduct reconnaissance behind enemy lines?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total[a]	Percentage of All Units
Yes	7	1	8	53.3
No	5	2	7	46.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]All of the yes and 5 of the 7 no responses represent units which do train selected personnel for "long range" or "stay-behind" patrol operations.

In what are they specifically trained?

Survival techniques	12	1	13
Communications	12	1	13
Avoidance of capture	10	1	11
Reporting	11	1	12
Manner and method of movement	9	0	9
Demolitions	10	1	11
No training	0	2	2

Is there an available SOP that contains guidance on this subject?

Yes	1	0	1	6.7
No	11	3	14	93.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

32

Table A 4

How many times during the past year has the armored cavalry platoon engaged in <u>night</u> reconnaissance training?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)[a]	CONUS (N = 3)[b]	Total	Percentage of All Units
	154	27	181	

[a] Two commanders did not designate the number of times. One said "often"; the other said "1/3 of training time".
[b] One commander said that he did not know, but that night training was given.

Was training sufficient to maintain satisfactory standards?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	7[a]	1	8	53.3
No	5[b]	2	7	46.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a] Two commanders said "yes," for border duty only; one said "yes," but only for scouts and infantry.
[b] One commander said "no," because it pertains to scouts only, not to the entire platoon. Two said "no," because they had no area available.

Is <u>night</u> training necessary?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

33

Table A 5

Are your armored cavalry platoon personnel cross trained?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)[a]	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	5	1	6	40.0
No	7	2	9	60.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Two yes responses were qualified: "to a degree" and "to an extent."

Which elements are truly interchangeable?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)					
	None	Rifle Squad	Support Squad	Scout Section	Tank Section	Total
Rifle squad with:	8	–	0	4	0	12
Support squad with:	11	1	–	0	0	12
Scout section with:	8	3	0	–	2	13[a]
Tank section with:	11	0	0	1	–	12
	CONUS (N = 3)					
Rifle squad with:	2	–	0	1	0	3
Support squad with:	2	1	–	1	0	4[b]
Scout section with:	2	1	0	–	1	4[b]
Tank section with:	2	0	0	1	–	3
Total	46	6	0	8	3	63

[a]One Seventh Army commander said the scout section was interchangeable with two other elements.

[b]One CONUS commander said the support squad and scout section were interchangeable with two other elements.

Is cross training truly necessary?

	Combat Ready	CONUS		
Yes	8	1	9	60.0
No	4	2	6	40.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 6

Is sufficient running room, and varied terrain, available to permit satis-
factory armored cavalry platoon training?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	2[a]	1[b]	3	20.0
No	10	2	12	80.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]One yes response modified to indicate "but not completely satisfactory."
[b]One yes response modified to include "insufficient area at home station."

If no, how do you overcome this obstacle?

	(N = 11)[a]	(N = 3)		
Wheeled vehicle exercises, and CPXs	3	0	3	21.4
Only at major training area	1	1	2	14.3
Obstacle only partially overcome	4	0	4	28.6
Do not overcome training obstacle	3	2	5	35.7
Total	11	3	14	100.0

[a]Only one officer gave an unqualified yes response to the first
question. The N = 11 represents 10 unqualified no responses and 1
qualified yes response.

Table A 7

During maneuvers have you ever had the specific mission of finding locations
of potential targets for friendly mass destruction weapons?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	7	1	8	53.3
No	5	2	7	46.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Number of times, or frequency?

Normal mission	5	0	5	33.3
SOP	2	1	3	20.0
EEI	2	1	3	20.0
None	2	1	3	20.0
Cavalry squadron does not have this capability	1	0	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 8

Does the armored cavalry platoon operate independently?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	6	2	8	53.3
No	6	1	7	46.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If **yes**, is this procedure normal?

	(N = 6)	(N = 2)		
Yes	5	1	6	75.0
No	1	1	2	25.0
Total	6	2	8	100.0

If **no**, under what conditions would the platoon operate independently?

	(N = 6)	(N = 1)		
Special mission	3[a]	0	3	42.8
When cut off from parent unit	2	0	2	28.6
Under rare conditions only	1	0	1	14.3
Never	0	1	1	14.3
Total	6	1	7	100.0

[a]One officer who responded to "Special mission" said, "But it really should be a normal mission, because we will operate independently."

Table A 9

What missions are normally assigned to the armored cavalry platoon? (Please list in order of importance and frequency.)[a]

Missions	Importance	Frequency
Zone reconnaissance	4.60	12
Route reconnaissance	4.40	13
Counterreconnaissance	3.33	10
Delaying action	3.33	11
Flank guard	2.60	9
Covering force	2.47	6
Area reconnaissance	2.13	8
Screening force	1.33	4
Anti-airborne defense	1.20	7
Rearguard action	1.13	6
Attack mission	.80	4
Route security	.33	1
Patrols	.20	1

[a]Combat Ready and CONUS units are combined in this table.

Table A 10

Do you feel that your unit is now combat ready?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	10[a]	0	10	66.7
No	2	3	5	33.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a] Four yes responses were qualified thus: "Need more field training," "Would keep my fingers crossed," "Platoon leaders are not combat ready."

If no, what do you feel you need to bring your unit up to combat-readiness status?

	(N = 2)	(N = 3)		
More field work	1	2	3	60.0
Less household requirements	1	1	2	40.0
Total	2	3	5	100.0

Table A 11

Is the tank section of the platoon normally employed as a unit?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is the tank section always employed as a unit?

Yes	5[a]	1	6	40.0
No	7	2	9	60.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a] One yes response was qualified thus: "Would split if light tanks were used."

If no, explain the exceptions.

	Number of Times Cited		Total
When given 2 routes to reconnoiter.	3	1	4
When we have 2 avenues of approach.	3	0	3
When we have 2 crossing-sites.	1	1	2
When in built-up area, and 2 streets.	2	0	2
When we have 2 road blocks.	1	1	2
Delay on broad front—2 avenues.	0	1	1
Total	10	4	14

Table A 12

Do you consider the current armored cavalry platoon organization satisfactory in view of the platoon's multiple mission requirements?

	Comb.t Ready (N = 12)[a]	CONUS (N = 3)[b]	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	10	2	12	80.0
No	2	1	3	20.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Two commanders suggested adding 2 men to the mortar squad, and 2 scout vehicles to the scout section (1 per scout squad).

[b]Two commanders suggested adding 1 tank to the tank section.

Table A 13

Do all personnel of the armored cavalry platoon need to be familiar with the contents of FM 5-36, Route Reconnaissance and Classification?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	4	3	7	46.7
No	8	0	8	53.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, which personnel must be familiar with FM 5-36?

	(N = 8)[a]
Scouts	8
Rifle	2
Platoon leader	3
Platoon sergeant	3

[a]All agreed that the scouts required knowledge of FM 5-36; 2 included the rifle squad; and 3 included the platoon leader and platoon sergeant.

Table A 14

It has recently been proposed to have 2 career patterns for armor officers. First, a command pattern--for individuals who by temperament and ability make good commanders; and second, a staff pattern--for officers better suited for administrative duties. How do you feel about this?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Agree	5	1	6	40.0
Disagree	7	1	8	53.3
No comment	0	1	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 15

Would you please estimate on the following chart the percentage of time your unit personnel now spend on the various categories of on-duty activities. Then show on the same chart the percentage of time you think your unit personnel should spend on the various categories of on-duty activities.

	Average %, All Units	
	Now	Should
Tactical Training: Weapons and weapons qualifications; small unit organization and tactics; crew drill; tactical exercises; scouting and patrolling; marches and bivouacs; first aid; communications; riot control; map reading; field sanitation; field fortifications; training of administrative, mess, supply and maintenance personnel, and drivers for combat, etc.	35	54
	19% increase	recommended
Nontactical Training: Information programs; character guidance; athletics; close order drill; training of administrative, mess, supply and maintenance personnel, and drivers for other than combat conditions, etc.	15	10
	5% decrease	recommended
Combat-Readiness Maintenance: Combat-readiness maintenance of vehicles, weapons, clothing, and equipment as required for combat conditions only.	22	29
	7% increase	recommended
Noncombat-Readiness Activities: a. HOUSEKEEPING--i.e., guard, area police; upkeep of billets; storage areas and grounds; operation of personnel support activities i.e., schools, clubs, recreation facilities, bus-drivers; maintenance of vehicles, weapons, clothing, equipment, beyond combat-readiness standards for inspections and ceremonies. b. SPECIAL ACTIVITIES--conduct of quality sports, weapons competitions, and ceremonies.	28	7
	21% decrease	recommended

Tables A 16 - A 37: Platoon Leader Training Requirements

Table A 16

Are all platoon leaders graduates of the Armor Officer Basic Course or the Armor Officer Orientation Course, the Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	9	3	12	80.0
No	3[a]	0	3	20.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Each unit whose commander gave a no response had one officer from the Fort Benning Infantry Officer Basic Course.

Table A 17

Do you feel that the Armor Officer Basic Course or the Armor Officer Orientation Course adequately prepares the student officer to command, control, and employ an armored cavalry platoon?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	1[a]	1	6.7
No	12	2	14[b]	93.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]The yes response was qualified with this remark: "In view of his lack of training and experience."

[b]The no responses were elucidated by such remarks as these: "Hell, no"; "does not prepare officer for cavalry operations"; "he is taught nothing and knows nothing about cavalry platoon operations"; "graduates should be, but are not, platoon leaders"; "emphatically no."

Table A 18

Do you consider your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements upon initial assignment (mark one)

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
fully qualified?	0	0	0	0.0
well qualified?	0	0	0	0.0
partially qualified?[a]	5	3	8	53.3
poorly qualified?[b]	7	0	7	46.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Five commanders who rated platoon leader replacements as "partially qualified" gave these explanations: "They are really poorly qualified, but they know something." "He has no knowledge and it takes 12 months to qualify him." "They have some preparation, but are not qualified." "Actually, he is unqualified." "They do have ROTC, so they must know something."

[b]Commanders who rated replacements as "poorly qualified," said the replacements were actually unqualified.

Table A 19

On the average, how many weeks are required to bring a newly assigned armored cavalry platoon leader up to the training level necessary to assure he is combat ready? (Mark One.)

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
1 to 3 weeks	0	0	0	0.0
3 to 5 weeks	0	0	0	0.0
5 to 8 weeks	1	0	1	6.7
8 to 10 weeks	2	1	3	20.0
More than 10 weeks	9	2	11[a]	73.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Eight of the eleven who said, "More than 10 weeks," said the time required was actually 8 to 12 months.

Table A 20

Do you feel that a special course in armored cavalry should be given to young officers prior to assignment to armored cavalry units?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If your reply was yes, do you feel this special course should be conducted at the Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky?

Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Why do you feel a special course is required? (Please be detailed.)

Replacements do not know weapons.	2	3	5
Cannot command and control platoon.	12	3	15
Do not know how to employ platoon.	12	3	15
Platoon is complex— 4 unlike elements.	12	3	15
Combined arms (integrated platoon) most difficult.	12	3	15
Total	50	15	65

What specific subjects do you think should be stressed?

Squad and section, function and employ	10	2	12
Platoon tactics—all types of missions	12	2	14
Command and control	12	2	14
How to move a platoon	1	0	1
All weapons (especially the mortar)	10	2	12
Communications	9	1	10
Maintenance (all vehicles)	7	1	8
Map reading	3	0	3
Demolitions	0	1	1
Supply economy	0	1	1
Chain of command	0	1	1
Responsibility of platoon leader	0	1	1

Table A 21

Do you feel you have an adequate measure for determining the armored cavalry platoon leader's state of combat readiness?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	2	14	93.3
No	0	1[a]	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]The commander who said that he did not have an adequate measure for determining a platoon leader's combat readiness said that the ATT scoring checklist should be standardized to eliminate individual scorers' "whims."

Table A 22

Of the following, where at the present time does the armored cavalry platoon leader acquire his skills?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)		CONUS (N = 3)		Total	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
The US Army Armor School	1	11	0	3	1[a]	14
Seventh Army Training Center, Vilseck	12	0	3	0	15	0
Divisional or regimental schools	1	11	0	3	1	14
Squadron schools	11	1	1	2	12	3[b]
Other	10	2	3	0	13	2[c]
Total	35	25	7	8	42	33

[a] The yes response was qualified thus: "TARS does not give complete enough training."

[b] The 3 commanders who gave no responses cited as the reason, "lack of time and adequate training space"; however all 3 units conducted night classes whenever it was possible.

[c] All those who gave yes responses and the two commanders who gave no responses said that OJT was the only "other" means of acquiring the skills.

Table A 23

Is this present system satisfactory?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	0	0	0.0
No	12	3	15	100.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, would you outline a better procedure?

TARS should train prior to assignment	7	2	9
A special school prior to assignment	1	0	1
Train him before assignment	3	0	3
Should be trained in ZI before assignment	1	0	1
No comment	0	1	1
Total	12	3	15

Table A 24

Do you feel that armored cavalry platoon leader skills are comparable to
tank platoon leader skills?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	0	0	0.0
No	12	3	15	100.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, will you point out the major differences? (Please be explicit.)

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total
Armored cavalry platoon more complex	12	3	15
Missions are multiple and vaired	12	3	15
Cavalry platoon leader without visual contact	8	0	8
Cavalry platoon has 4 unlike elements	12	3	15
Cavalry platoon leader needs greater tactical knowledge	12	3	15
Does not operate in mass	10	0	10
Cavalry platoon leader makes more decisions	12	1	13
Combined arms requires more knowledge	12	3	15
Cavalry platoon leader must coordinate a unit composed of different capabilities, speeds, fire-power, and missions toward the accomplishment of a single mission or objective—sometimes on 2 axes.	12	3	15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table A 25

Are your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements, upon initial assignment, prepared to discharge their duties as armored cavalry platoon leaders?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	0	0	0.0
No	12	3	15	100.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, why not?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	
Lack knowledge of how to employ platoon	12	2	14	
Cannot command and control platoon	9	1	10	
Do not know equipment and duties	7	0	7	
Insufficient basic training in recon (to include weapons, maintenance, and commo)	12	2	14	
No understanding of tactics: (as pertains to recon platoon)	12	3	15	

Table A 26

Do you want your armored cavalry platoon leaders to be fully qualified upon initial assignment to your command?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 27

Do your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements know how to employ the

	Combat Ready (N = 12)		CONUS (N = 3)		Total	
	Yes	No	Yes[a]	No	Yes	No
rifle squad?	2	10	1	2	3	12
support squad?	1	11	1	2	2	13
tank section?	9[b]	3	1	2	10	5
scout section?	0	12	1	2	1	14

[a] Qualified by the remark, "After a fashion--all could be no."
[b] Two yes responses were qualified by "Generally."

Table A 28

Do your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements know the various aspects
of coordinating the employment of the rifle squad, support squad, tank
section, and scout section?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	1[a]	1	6.7
No	12	2	14	93.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a] Qualified by "After a fashion."

What is their greatest weakness?

Insufficient tactical background	7	3	10
Employment and control of scouts	8	0	8
Inability to coordinate 4 unlike elements	11	3	14
Lack of knowledge of how platoon operates	12	3	14
Tend to forget to employ elements not visible	9	0	9

What is their greatest strength?

Willingness to learn	7	3	10
Interest in their assignment	9	2	11
Youth, ambition, and desire	11	3	14
Belief in the armor branch	9	0	9
Use of tanks	4	0	4

Table A 29

Is it necessary for an armored cavalry platoon leader to be fully qualified to teach platoon personnel all the **specific** **individual** skills required for duty in the

	Combat Ready (N = 12)		CONUS (N = 3)		Total	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Rifle squad?	7	5	3	0	10	5
Support squad?	6	6	3	0	9	6
Tank section?	7	5	3	0	10	5
Scout section?	9	3	3	0	12	3
Total	29	19	12	0	41	19

Table A 30

Is it necessary for an armored cavalry platoon leader to be fully qualified to teach the sections and squads the manner and method in which the individual sections and squads are employed?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)		CONUS (N = 3)		Total	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Rifle squad	10	2	3	0	13	2
Support squad	11	1	3	0	14	1
Tank section	11	1	3	0	14	1
Scout section	12	0	3	0	15	0
Total	44	4	12	0	56	4

Table A 31

Is it necessary for an armored cavalry platoon leader to be fully qualified to teach the sections and squads the manner and method of integrated platoon employment?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

48

Table A 32

What are the major difficulties or stumbling blocks which prevent the armored cavalry platoon leader from effectively "coordinating, commanding, and controlling" his platoon?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total
Lack of prior schooling	9	1	10
Lack of knowledge of platoon operations	11	3	14
Has too little training prior to assignment	9	2	11
Lack of understanding of platoon tactics	8	3	11
Cannot control the 4 platoon elements	7	2	9
Cannot issue a clear oral order	3	0	3
Does not know _how_ to use the platoon	9	3	12
Fails to exercise effective leadership	2	0	2
Lacks confidence, due to lack of "know-how"	2	0	2
Does not know his weapons or communications	3	0	3
Total	63	14	77

Table A 33

Do your armored cavalry platoon leaders really have the capability of effective command and control?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	8[a]	1	9	60.0
No	4	2	6	40.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Five _yes_ responses were qualified with the remark, "They have the capability, but not the knowledge, skill, or know-how."

If _no_, why not?[b]

Not schooled in command and control	1	0	1
Do not know their skills or duties	1	0	1
Lack of knowledge of platoon operations	1	0	1
Do not have the "know-how"	2	0	2
Do not become capable until 12 months on the job	0	1	1
Lack of prior training	1	1	2
Total	6	2	8

[b]All commanders said, "They are willing, but do not know _how_."

49

Table A 34

What armored cavalry platoon leader skills, in your opinion, do you feel should be <u>unit</u> trained?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total
On-the-job training	12	3	15
Leadership	7	1	8
Polish and give him experience	12	2	14
Opportunity to apply his knowledge	12	3	15
Operate under unit SOP	4	0	4
Improve, through practice, commo and maintenance	6	2	8
Supply and administrative procedures	0	1	1
Practice school trained subjects	2	0	2
Weld into a team	2	0	2
Total	57	12	69

Table A 35

Is it necessary, in your opinion, that a fully qualified armored cavalry platoon leader have a "thorough knowledge" of <u>troop</u> tactics?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	6	1	7	46.7
No	6	2	8	53.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is this knowledge essential to the performance of his duties?

Yes	6	1	7	46.7
No	6	2	8	53.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 36

Is it necessary, in your opinion, that the fully qualified armored cavalry platoon leader have a "thorough knowledge" of <u>squadron</u> tactics?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	1	1	2	13.3
No	11	2	13	86.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 37

In a delaying action, does the armored cavalry platoon leader _always_
accompany the last element to withdraw?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	5	0	5	33.3
No	7	3	10	66.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If _no_, cite some exceptions.

To recon the next delay position	1	0	1
To set up the next delay position	1	1	2
Width of sector, must be in a position to communicate and control action of entire platoon	1	0	1
Withdrawing behind a barrier, he may be more concerned with organizing position behind barrier, than remaining with the last element	1	0	1
Doctrine is much too restrictive	1	0	1
During a passage of lines	1	0	1
Mission will be determining factor	1	0	1
Should _always_ be where he can best control action of platoon in the accomplishment of his mission	1	1	2
If he is leader of a stay-behind patrol	0	1	1
He may be at Troop getting further orders	1	0	1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Tables A 38 - A 48: Section and Squad Leader Training Requirements

52

Table A 38

Do you receive enlisted replacements by MOS?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS[a] (N=2)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	2	14	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	2	14	100.0

[a]One officer declined to comment.

Can you assign these personnel to a specific section or squad without changing their MOS?

Yes	6[b]	2	8	57.1
No	6	0	6	42.9
Total	12	2	14	100.0

[b]Five yes responses were qualified by these remarks: "generally," "except mortar," "most of the time," "usually," and "we must."

Do you have to assign new MOS's?

Yes	10	1	11	78.6
No	2	1	3	21.4
Total	12	2	14	100.0

Do you normally receive what you want, MOS wise?

Yes	11	2	13	92.9
No	1	0	1	7.1
Total	12	2	14	100.0

Does the system of replacement work satisfactorily from your viewpoint?

Yes	3	0	3	21.4
No	9	2	11	78.6
Total	12	2	14	100.0

If no, why not? (Please be detailed.)	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total
Replacements come with requested MOS, but are not skilled in reconnaissance operations; they are not recon trained.	9	2	11
We need another digit to indicate replacements are reconnaissance trained.	7	1	8
Replacements arrive too late, although they are assigned and picked up on MR, but are not present for duty. Leaves unit under strength.	7	2	9
Replacements must be retrained to perform reconnaissance duties, and in many instances, new MOS's assigned.	9	1	10
Too many replacements have physical profile (no running, no loud noises, no long exposure to cold).	1	0	1

Table A 39

Are enlisted replacements for sections and squads qualified upon assignment to discharge their duties?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=2)	Total	Percentage of all units
Yes	0	0	0	0.0
No	12	2	14	100.0
Total	12	2	14	100.0

Are section and squad leader replacements qualified upon assignment to discharge their duties and responsibilities?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=2)	Total	Percentage of all units
Yes	2	0	2	14.3
No	10	2	12	85.7
Total	12	2	14	100.0

If no, list the major deficiencies for:	Number times Mentioned[a] (N=12)
Rifle squad leader	
Too many from infantry units, and have no knowledge of recon operations.	7
Inadequate knowledge of MOS.	8
Support squad leader	
Inadequate knowledge of MOS.	7
Come from infantry units, do not realize they are direct support weapon for fast moving and highly mobile unit.	8
Are not reconnaissance trained. Do not know the 4.2 mortar.	11
Tank section leader	
Better than other section and squad leaders but not qualified for recon platoon.	10
Do not know reconnaissance platoon operations, but is the platoon sergeant.	11
Satisfactory.	3
Scout section leader	
Most of these are converted MOS's. Do not know how to scout for recon platoon.	10
None trained as scouts. Must be retrained.	7

[a]Section and squad leaders are assigned by rank. Some have come back to a line unit and then want to be trained for an MOS with pro-pay. In one instance 15 military police, with rank, were assigned to squadron. All had to be retrained to fit an MOS slot.

Table A 40

Are you faced with any major difficulties in the conduct of section and squad training?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=2)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	8	1	9	64.3
No	4	1	5	35.7
Total	12	2	14	100.0

If yes, what are they?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total	
Lack of an adequate training area	8	1	9	
Cannot get tanks off the roads	5	0	5	
Lack of time which can be devoted to training	5	1	6	
Lack of firing ranges	6	1	7	
Lack of ammunition	3	0	3	
Turnover of personnel too rapid	0	1	1	
Total	27	4	31	

Table A 41

Do you feel the training received by the sections and squads is adequate?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	8[a]	1	9	60.0
No	4	2	6	40.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Two yes responses were qualified with the remark, "When we have access to an adequate training area."

Table A 42

Do you feel the training received by the entire platoon, as an intact unit, is satisfactory?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	5[a]	1	6	40.0
No	7	2	9	60.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]One yes response was qualified: "When we have an adequate training area available."

55

Table A 43

Who in the armored cavalry platoon should be trained to detect and remove land mines and booby traps?

		Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
	Platoon leader				
Yes		12	2	14	93.3
No		0	1	1	6.7
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Tank section leader (platoon sergeant)				
Yes		7	3	10	66.7
No		5	0	5	33.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Scout section leader				
Yes		12	3	15	100.0
No		0	0	0	0.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Scout squad leader				
Yes		11	2	13	86.7
No		1	1	2	13.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Scout driver				
Yes		7	0	7	46.7
No		5	3	8	53.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Scout observer				
Yes		10	0	10	66.7
No		2	3	5	33.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Rifle squad leader				
Yes		12	3	15	100.0
No		0	0	0	0.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Senior rifleman				
Yes		11	3	14	93.3
No		1	0	1	6.7
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Rifleman				
Yes		10	3	13	86.7
No		2	0	2	13.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0

56

Table A 43 (Continued)

		Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Rifle squad driver					
Yes		6	1	7	46.7
No		6	2	8	53.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
Support squad leader					
Yes		6	1	7	46.7
No		6	2	8	53.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
Support squad gunner					
Yes		6	0	6	40.0
No		6	3	9	60.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
Support squad assistant gunner					
Yes		5	0	5	33.3
No		7	3	10	66.7
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
Support squad driver					
Yes		4	0	4	26.7
No		8	3	11	73.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 44

Who in the armored cavalry platoon should be trained to implace and remove demolitions?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Scouts	2	0	2	13.3
Scouts and riflemen	7	2	9	60.0
Scouts, rifles, and support squad	1	0	1	6.7
Platoon leader, platoon sergeant, scouts, and rifle squad leader	1	1	2	13.3
Everybody	1	0	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table A 45

What skills above and beyond those required in daylight are necessary to enable the armored cavalry platoon to accomplish its missions in darkness?

Tank section	Combat Ready[a]	CONUS	Total
Employment of searchlights	9	2	11
Infrared (use in driving and firing)	10	3	13
Firing with artificial illumination	8	2	10
Blackout driving (night driving)	6	2	8
Use of range cards (making and using)	3	2	5
Use of maps, cross-country navigation	2	2	4
Dispel fear of darkness by training at night	1	1	2

Scout section			
Infrared (firing) and night firing with illumination	7	2	9
Operation of listening posts	6	2	8
Operation and use of trip flares	3	1	4
Night driving and land navigation	10	2	12
Terrain appreciation	3	0	3
Mounted and dismounted patrols	8	3	11
Use of range card	2	0	2
Use of maps	5	3	8

Rifle squad			
Dismounted movement (noise discipline, direction, night vision)	11	2	13
Command and control techniques	8	2	10
Listening posts	6	2	8
Support of tanks	7	1	8
Patrolling	6	2	8
Night firing	6	2	8

Support squad			
Night occupation of position	7	2	9
Selection of firing position	9	2	11
Night firing, to include illuminating rounds	11	3	14
Utilization of trip flares	3	0	3
Night movement (mounted)	8	2	10
Terrain appreciation (land orientation at night)	3	0	3

[a]One officer said the platoon should practice, at night, everything they do during daylight, because they perform the same tasks day or night.

58

Table A 46

Do sections and squads presently possess these night skills?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	10	1	11	73.3
No	2	2	4	26.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is there any way of determining whether or not they have learned these night skills?

Yes	11	3	14[a]	93.3
No	1	0	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

What measuring devices are used?

Army Training Tests	2	1	3[b]	20.0
By observing training	10	2	12	80.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Six commanders who gave yes responses said that a standardized night test and check list was badly needed.

[b]Two of the three units which used the ATT said they badly needed the test and check list.

Table A 47

Are all personnel in the armored cavalry platoon required to know how to call
for and adjust artillery?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	11	3	14	93.3
No	1[a]	0	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]One commander required only the platoon leader, platoon sergeant,
and scouts to possess this skill.

Table A 48

Are all section and squad leaders capable of commanding all other
sections and squads?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	0	0	0.0
No	12	3	15	100.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is this versatility an absolute requirement?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total	Percentage
Yes	0	0	0	0.0
No	12	3	15	100.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Tables A 49 – A 60:   Special Skill Requirements for Armored Cavalry Platoon
Personnel

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table A 49

In your opinion, do you feel the following individuals need more than Basic
Map Reading ability to satisfactorily perform their duties?

		Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
	Platoon leader				
Yes		12	3	15	100.0
No		0	0	0	0.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Tank section leader				
Yes		7	3	10	66.7
No		5	0	5	33.3
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Support squad leader				
Yes		9	3	12	80.0
No		3	0	3	20.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Rifle squad leader				
Yes		6	3	9	60.0
No		6	0	6	40.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Scout section leader				
Yes		12	3	15	100.0
No		0	0	0	0.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 50

In your opinion do you feel the following individuals need Intermediate Map Reading ability to satisfactorily perform their duties?

		Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
	Platoon leader				
Yes		12	3	15	100.0
No		0	0	0	0.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Tank section leader				
Yes		6	3	9	60.0
No		6	0	6	40.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Support squad leader				
Yes		9	3	12	80.0
No		3	0	3	20.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Rifle squad leader				
Yes		6	3	9	60.0
No		6	0	6	40.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0
	Scout section leader				
Yes		12	3	15	100.0
No		0	0	0	0.0
	Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 51

In your opinion do you feel that the following individuals need Advanced Map
Reading ability to satisfactorily perform their duties?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Platoon leader				
Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0
Tank section leader				
Yes	5	2	7	46.7
No	7	1	8	53.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0
Support squad leader				
Yes	8	2	10	66.7
No	4	1	5	33.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0
Rifle squad leader				
Yes	3	2	5	33.3
No	9	1	10	66.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0
Scout section leader				
Yes	11	3	14	93.3
No	1	0	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table A 52

How many times within the last year has the scout section or rifle squad been employed in **airmobile** operations? (Select one.)

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Never	8	2	10	66.7
Once	2	0	2	13.3
2 to 5 times	0	1	1	6.7
More than 5 times	2	0	2	13.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Were the scout vehicles air transported?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	1	0	1	6.7
No	11	3	14	93.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Are all scout section personnel familiar with the techniques applicable to loading and landing phases of helicopter operations?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	4	1	5	33.3
No	8	2	10	66.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Do scout personnel have a thorough knowledge of:

	Yes	No	Total
Selection and marking of landing sites?	6	9	15
Arm and hand signals to guide aircraft?	4	11	15
Emergency procedures for take-off, flight, and landing?	4	11	15
Method of loading and securing equipment in helicopter?	2	13	15
Total	16	44	60

Is the training mentioned above necessary in your opinion?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	7	2	9	60.0
No	5[a]	0	5	33.3
No comment	0	1	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Three officers said the procedures were so simple that training could be conducted 20 minutes before flight.

Table A 53

Are all members of the scout sections capable of performing CBR monitoring and survey operations?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	6	2	8	53.3
No	6	1	7	46.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, which personnel should have this knowledge?

	(N=6)	(N=1)		
Scout section leader				
Yes	6	1	7	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	6	1	7	100.0
Scout squad leader				
Yes	5	1	6	85.7
No	1	0	1	14.3
Total	6	1	7	100.0
Scout observer				
Yes	2	0	2	28.6
No	4	1	5	71.4
Total	6	1	7	100.0
Scout driver				
Yes	1	0	1	14.3
No	5	1	6	85.7
Total	6	1	7	100.0

Is the necessary equipment for this purpose available within the armored cavalry platoon?

	(N=12)	(N=3)		
Yes	10	2	12	80.0
No	2[a]	1	3	20.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is CBR monitoring and survey operations a necessary requirement for scout section personnel?

Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Two of the 3 who gave no responses said, "but is available."

66

Table A 54

In the rifle squad, which personnel are assigned the duty of firing the rocket launcher?

	Yes	No	Do Not Know	No Specific Assignment	Varies in Each Troop	Total (N=15)
Rifle squad leader	2	7	2	2	2	15
Senior rifleman	6	3	2	2	2	15
Rifleman	6	3	2	2	2	15
Driver	1	8	2	2	2	15
Total	15	21	8	8	8	60

Why were these specific people selected?

	Squad Leader	Senior Rifleman	Rifleman	Driver	Total
Most available for task	0	0	5	0	5
Most experienced soldier	0	5	0	0	5
All should know how	1	1	1	1	4
Other 2 men handle ammo and weapons	1	0	0	0	1
Total	2	6	6	1	15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table A 55

Are all members of the armored cavalry platoon trained in decontamination procedures for individual vehicles?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	11	3	14	93.3
No	1	0	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is this an essential requirement?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 56

Are armored cavalry platoon personnel trained in use of air photos?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	8	2	10	66.7
No	4	1	5	33.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Are they trained to interpret air photos?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	2	1	3	20.0
No	10	2	12	80.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is this skill essential at platoon level?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	2	1	3	20.0
No	10	2	12	80.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 57

Is there a requirement for a CW operator at the armored cavalry platoon level?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	2[a]	0	2	13.3
No	10	3	13	86.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

[a]Both commanders who gave yes responses qualified them thus: "for 'stay-behind' patrols--one for each platoon."

68

Table A 58

Are all scouts trained to perform authorized maintenance on scout radio equipment?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	10	2	12	80.0
No	2	1	3	20.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is it necessary that all scouts have this knowledge and skill?

Yes	10	3	13	86.7
No	2	0	2	13.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 59

Are all scouts trained to prepare clear and concise oral and written messages?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	2	14	93.3
No	0	1	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Is this requirement essential?

Yes	12	3	15	100.0
No	0	0	0	0.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

Table A 60

Is the armored cavalry platoon communications system adequate for complete control of the platoon under all normal operating conditions?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	9	3	12	80.0
No	3	0	3	20.0
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, please explain why not. (N = 3)

Every scout vehicle should have a mounted radio.
Platoon leader jeep should have the same radio as the tank.
Long range patrols (stay-behind) require long range equipment not organic to cavalry squadron.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Tables A 61 - A 63: Desirable Trends in Organization and Developments in
Equipment

Table A 61

For the future nuclear battlefield, do you feel the present organizational structure of the armored cavalry regiment is adequate?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	9	2	11	73.3
No	1	0	1	6.7
No comment	1	1	2	13.3
Not qualified to answer	1	0	1	6.7
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If **no**, how should it be modified? (N = 1)

Personnel spaces should be added at all levels to provide some depth.

Table A 62

Are you satisfied with your present vehicular equipment?

	Combat Ready (N = 12)	CONUS (N = 3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	1	1	6.7
No	12	2	14	93.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, will you please explain.

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total
1/4 ton scout vehicle should be replaced with a tracked vehicle, without turret.	6	2	8
M59, with 2 engines, is constant source of mechanical trouble.	5	0	5
Replace M48A2 tank with the light tank.	7	0	7
Recovery vehicle M-74 is worthless; it cannot cope with the M48A2 tank.	2	0	2
Need more gasoline refueling vehicles.	2	0	2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table A 63

Do you feel that armored cavalry platoon training literature is adequate?

	Combat Ready (N=12)	CONUS (N=3)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	1	1	6.7
No	12	2	14	93.3
Total	12	3	15	100.0

If no, what is needed?

	Combat Ready	CONUS	Total
Need specifics, emphasize techniques of operation at platoon, section, squad level.	9	2	11
Need manual for platoon telling them how to accomplish each type operation and why.	10	2	12
Need literature with check lists for platoon, section, and squad leaders.	7	1	8
Need FM directed to the platoon--this is a definite requirement.	12	2	14
FM 17-35 is all right for the squadron commander, and maybe even for the troop commander, but it is unsuited for the platoon.	10	1	11
Total times mentioned			

APPENDIX B: List of Questions on Which the Interviews Were Based

1. <u>Armored</u> <u>Cavalry</u> <u>Platoon</u> <u>Training</u> <u>Problems</u>, <u>Practices</u>, <u>and</u> <u>Procedures</u>.

What do you consider to be your biggest command problem or headache?   (Table 1)

What is your biggest or most difficult training problem?
      What do you need to solve or eliminate it?   (Table 2)

Is the armored cavalry platoon trained to conduct reconnaissance
behind enemy lines?
      In what are they specifically trained?
      Is there an available SOP that contains guidance on this subject?   (Table 3)

How many times during the past year has the armored cavalry platoon
engaged in <u>night</u> reconnaissance training?
      Was training sufficient to maintain satisfactory standards?
      Is <u>night</u> training necessary?   (Table 4)

Are your armored cavalry platoon personnel cross trained?   (Table 5)

Is sufficient running-room, and varied terrain, available to permit
satisfactory armored cavalry platoon training?
      If <u>no</u>, how do you overcome this obstacle?   (Table 6)

During maneuvers have you ever had the <u>specific</u> mission of finding
locations of potential targets for friendly mass destruction weapons?
      Number of times, or frequency?   (Table 7)

Does the armored cavalry platoon operate independently?
      If <u>yes</u>, is this procedure normal?
      If <u>no</u>, under what conditions would the platoon operate
      independently?   (Table 8)

What missions are normally assigned to the armored cavalry platoon?
(Please list in order of importance and frequency.)   (Table 9)

Do you feel that your unit is now combat ready?
      If <u>no</u>, what do you feel you need to bring your unit up to
      combat-readiness status?   (Table 10)

Is the tank section of the platoon normally employed as a unit?
      Is the tank section <u>always</u> employed as a unit?
      If <u>no</u>, explain the exceptions.   (Table 11)

Do you consider the current armored cavalry platoon organization
satisfactory in view of the platoon's multiple mission requirements?   (Table 12)

Do <u>all</u> personnel of the armored cavalry platoon need to be familiar
with the contents of FM 5-36, <u>Route</u> <u>Reconnaissance</u> <u>and</u> <u>Classification</u>?
      If <u>no</u>, which personnel must be familiar with FM 5-36?   (Table 13)

It has recently been proposed to have 2 career patterns for armor officers.
First, a command pattern—for individuals who by temperament and ability make
good commanders; and second, a staff pattern—for officers better suited for
administrative duties. How do you feel about this?   (Table 14)

74

Would you please estimate, on the following chart, the percentage of time your unit personnel now spend on the various categories of on-duty activities? Then show on the same chart the percentage of time you think your unit personnel should spend on the various categories of on-duty activities? (Table 15)

2. Platoon Leader Training Requirements.

Are all platoon leaders graduates of the Armor Officer Basic Course or the Armor Officer Orientation Course, the Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky? (Table 16)

Do you feel that the Armor Officer Basic Course or the Armor Officer Orientation Course adequately prepares the student officer to command, control, and employ an armored cavalry platoon? (Table 17)

Do you consider your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements upon initial assignment (mark one)
    fully qualified?
    well qualified?
    partially qualified?
    poorly qualified? (Table 18)

On the average, how many weeks are required to bring a newly assigned armored cavalry platoon leader up to the training level necessary to assure he is combat ready? (Mark one.)
    1 to 3 weeks?
    3 to 5 weeks?
    5 to 8 weeks?
    8 to 10 weeks?
    More than 10 weeks? (Table 19)

Do you feel that a special course in armored cavalry should be given to young officers prior to assignment to armored cavalry units?
    If your reply is yes, do you feel this special course should be conducted at the Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky?
    Why do you feel a special course is required?
    What specific subjects do you think should be stressed? (Table 20)

Do you feel you have an adequate measure for determining the armored cavalry platoon leader's state of combat readiness? (Table 21)

Of the following, where at the present time does the armored cavalry platoon leader acquire his skills?
    The U.S. Army Armor School.
    Seventh Army Training Center, Vilseck.
    Divisional or regimental schools.
    Other. (Table 22)

Is this present system satisfactory?
    If no, would you outline a better procedure? (Table 23)

Do you feel that armored cavalry platoon leader skills are comparable
to tank platoon leader skills?
    If <u>no</u>, will you point out the major differences? (Please be   (Table 24)
    explicit.)

Are your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements, upon initial
assignment, prepared to discharge their duties as armored cavalry
platoon leaders?
    If <u>no</u>, why not?   (Table 25)

Do you want your armored cavalry platoon leaders to be fully qualified
upon initial assignment to your command?   (Table 26)

Do your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements know how to employ
the
    rifle squad?
    support squad?
    tank section?
    scout section?   (Table 27)

Do your armored cavalry platoon leader replacements know the various
aspects of coordinating the employment of the rifle squad, support
squad, tank section, and scout section?
    What is their greatest weakness?
    What is their greatest strength?   (Table 28)

Is it necessary for an armored cavalry platoon leader to be fully
qualified to teach platoon personnel all the <u>specific individual</u>
skills required for duty in the
    rifle squad?
    support squad?
    tank section?
    scout section?   (Table 29)

Is it necessary for an armored cavalry platoon leader to be fully
qualified to teach the sections and squads the manner and method
in which individual sections and squads are employed?   (Table 30)

Is it necessary for an armored cavalry platoon leader to be fully
qualified to teach the sections and squads the manner and method of
integrated platoon employment?   (Table 31)

What are the major difficulties or stumbling blocks which prevent the
armored cavalry platoon leader from effectively "coordinating, com-
manding, and controlling" his platoon?   (Table 32)

Do your armored cavalry platoon leaders really have the capability of
effective command and control?
    If <u>no</u>, why not?   (Table 33)

What armored cavalry platoon leader skills, in your opinion, do you
feel should be <u>unit</u> trained?   (Table 34)

Is it necessary, in your opinion, that a fully qualified armored
cavalry platoon leader have a "thorough knowledge" of troop tactics?
    Is this knowledge essential to the performance of his duties?   (Table 35)

Is it necessary, in your opinion, that the fully qualified armored
cavalry platoon leader have a "thorough knowledge" of squadron tactics? (Table 36)

In a delaying action, does the armored cavalry platoon leader always
accompany the last element to withdraw?
    If no, will you cite some exceptions?   (Table 37)

3. Section and Squad Leader Training Requirements.

Do you receive enlisted replacements by MOS?
    Can you assign these personnel to a specific section or squad
    without changing their MOS?
    Do you have to assign new MOS's?
    Do you normally receive what you want, MOS wise?
    Does the system of replacement work satisfactorily from your
    viewpoint?
    If no, why not? (Please be detailed.)   (Table 38)

Are enlisted replacements for sections and squads qualified upon
assignment to discharge their duties?
    Are section and squad leader replacements qualified upon
    assignment to discharge their duties and responsibilities?
    If no, list the major deficiencies for
        rifle squad leader.
        support squad leader.
        tank section leader.
        scout section leader.   (Table 39)

Are you faced with any major difficulties in the conduct of section
and squad training?
    If yes, what are they?   (Table 40)

Do you feel the training received by the sections and squads is
adequate?   (Table 41)

Do you feel the training received by the entire platoon, as an intact
unit, is satisfactory?   (Table 42)

Who in the armored cavalry platoon should be trained to detect and
remove land mines and booby traps?
    Platoon leader?
    Tank section leader (also platoon sergeant)?
    Scout section leader?
    Scout squad leader?
    Scout driver?
    Scout observer?
    Rifle squad leader?
    Senior rifleman?
    Rifleman?

Rifle squad driver?
Support squad leader?
Support squad gunner?
Support squad assistant gunner?
Support squad driver?   (Table 43)

Who in the armored cavalry platoon should be trained to implace
and remove demolitions?   (Table 44)

What skills above and beyond those required in daylight are necessary
to enable the armored cavalry platoon to accomplish its missions in
darkness?
    Tank section?
    Scout section?
    Rifle squad?
    Support squad?   (Table 45)

Do sections and squads presently possess these night skills?
    Is there any way of determining whether or not they have
    learned these night skills?
    What measuring devices are used?   (Table 46)

Are all personnel in the armored cavalry platoon required to know how
to call for and adjust artillery?   (Table 47)

Are all section and squad leaders capable of commanding all other
sections and squads?
    Is this versatility an absolute requirement?   (Table 48)

4. Special Skill Requirements for Armored Cavalry Platoon Personnel.

In your opinion do you feel the following individuals need more than
Basic Map Reading ability to satisfactorily perform their duties?
    Platoon leader?
    Tank section leader?
    Support squad leader?
    Rifle squad leader?
    Scout section leader?   (Table 49)

In your opinion do you feel the following individuals need Interme-
diate Map Reading ability to satisfactorily perform their duties?
    Platoon leader?
    Tank section leader?
    Support squad leader?
    Rifle squad leader?
    Scout section leader?   (Table 50)

In your opinion do you feel the following individuals need Advanced
Map Reading ability to satisfactorily perform their duties?
    Platoon leader?
    Tank section leader?
    Support squad leader?
    Rifle squad leader?
    Scout section leader?   (Table 51)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

How many times within the last year has the scout section or rifle
squad been employed in airmobile operations?
    Were the scout vehicles transported?
    Are all scout section personnel familiar with the techniques
    applicable to loading and landing phases of helicopter operations?
    Do scout personnel have a thorough knowledge of
        Selection and marking of landing sites?
        Arm and hand signals to guide aircraft?
        Emergency procedures for take-off, flight, and landing?
        Method of loading and securing equipment in helicopter?
    Is the training mentioned above necessary in your opinion?   (Table 52)

Are all members of the scout sections capable of performing CBR
monitoring and survey operations?
    If no, which personnel should have this knowledge?
    Is the necessary equipment for this purpose available within the
    armored cavalry platoon?
    Is CBR monitoring and survey operations a necessary requirement
    for scout section personnel?   (Table 53)

Which personnel in the armored cavalry platoon are trained to operate
the short range ground radar?
    By whom are these people trained?
    Do you feel this equipment should be organic to the armored cavalry
    platoon?
        If yes or no, why?

In the rifle squad, which personnel are assigned the duty of firing the
rocket launcher?
    Why were these specific people selected?   (Table 54)

Are all members of the armored cavalry platoon trained in decontam-
ination procedures for individual vehicles?
    Is this an essential requirement?   (Table 55)

Are armored cavalry platoon personnel trained in use of air photos?
    Are they trained to interpret air photos?
    Is this skill essential at platoon level?   (Table 56)

Is there a requirement for a CW operator at the armored cavalry
platoon level?   (Table 57)

Are all scouts trained to perform authorized maintenance on scout
radio equipment?
    Is it necessary that all scouts have this knowledge and skill?   (Table 58)

Are all scouts trained to prepare clear and concise oral and written
messages?
    Is this requirement essential?   (Table 59)

Is the armored cavalry platoon communications system adequate for
complete control of the platoon under all normal operating conditions?
    If no, will you explain why not?   (Table 60)

79

5. <u>Desired</u> <u>Trends</u> <u>in</u> <u>Organization</u> <u>and</u> <u>Developments</u> <u>in</u> <u>Equipment</u>.

For the future nuclear battlefield, do you feel the present organizational structure of the armored cavalry regiment is adequate?
If <u>no</u>, how should it be modified?   (Table 61)

Are you satisfied with your present vehicular equipment?
If <u>no</u>, will you please explain?   (Table 62)

Do you feel that armored cavalry platoon training literature is adequate?
If <u>no</u>, what is needed?   (Table 63)